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Abstract
We analyze perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and ten-
sors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is
based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples
for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might
also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communi-
cation and the ability to argue and reason. Due to its compositional nature, a set of sentences can
describe a scene in great detail, avoiding the explosion in complexity with flat representations. A set
of SPO sentences can be described by a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adja-
cency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and
associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and
explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and
memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit per-
ception and declarative memories require a complex semantic decoder, which, in a basic realization,
has four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, a memory-
less representation layer for the broadcasting of information —the “blackboard”, or the “canvas” of
the brain—, third, an index layer representing concepts, and fourth, a working memory layer as a
processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to
the global workspace theory. Whereas simple semantic decoding might be performed already by
higher animals, the generation of triple statements, requiring working memory as part of a complex
semantic decoder, is a layered sequential process likely performed only by humans. In the resulting
chatterbox decoding, semantic consistency is encouraged on the representation level. Both semantic
and episodic memory contribute context and thus complement sensory input with non-perceptual in-
formation: agents have memory systems for a purpose, i.e., to make better decisions! In a Bayesian
brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior distribution for observable triple statements.
We propose that —in evolution and during development— semantic memory, episodic memory, and
natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents’ process to gain a deeper understanding
of sensory information. Our mathematical model provides some fresh perspectives on much-debated
issues concerning the relationship between perception, semantic memory, and episodic memory. We
present a concrete model implementation and validate some aspects of our proposed model on bench-
mark data where we demonstrate state-of-the-art performance.
∗Corresponding author, Volker.Tresp@lmu.de
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1 Introduction
With an increase in higher animals’ abilities to move and act came a growing demand for high-performing
perceptual systems (Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). We argue in this paper that, in
the course of this development, it became an important faculty that an agent could analyze relationships
between entities, e.g., in visual scenes, and that for this faculty, the agent needed a complex semantic
decoder, i.e., a mapping from a sensory vector space to explicit sentences describing, e.g., a visual scene.
By achieving complex semantic decoding, agents developed the ability to communicate, e.g., they
could inform other agents that there is a leopard waiting outside the hide-out. Further development
included the ability to argue, and human agents even developed the ability for logical reasoning, which
eventually enabled humans to explore mathematics and the sciences.
Whereas simple semantic decoding might be a capability of higher animals, we propose that complex
semantic decoding requires working memory and might be a faculty unique to humans. The ability to
perform complex semantic decoding might also be the reason why humans are capable of grammatical
language, beyond the simple utterances of other primates.
An agent needs more than just perception: it needs to remember where it had been before, why it is
where it is, and what the general context is, beyond the here and now. For example, an agent needs to
remember that even though perception does not give a clue, there is still a leopard waiting outside the
hide-out. Thus there is a need for remembering the immediate past (the agent remembers that it is in
the hide-out because the leopard was chasing it), and this ability developed into episodic memory. Once
developed, several side benefits evolved. Episodic memory can provide training data for the brain, it
reminds the agent about past situations similar to the current one, and it contributes to imagination and
planning (Kumaran, Hassabis, & McClelland, 2016).
Another faculty agents developed is semantic memory, which consists of two parts. First, there is
knowledge about which concepts in the world exist, like classes of things, entities, locations, attributes,
and predicates. Second, there is knowledge of facts concerning these concepts. Semantic memory can
be important for survival: humans simply know that lions are dangerous, even if a lion looks cozy and
sleepy and even if an individual did not yet have an unpleasant encounter with a lion. One can say
that episodic memory is more egocentric (what did the agent experience), whereas semantic memory
is more allocentric (what is true, independent of the personal experience of the agent), although as we
argue, semantic memory, to a great extent, also evolved out of an agent’s perception. We discuss the
close relationship between semantic memory (“things we know”) and episodic memory (“things we
remember”). We suggest that semantic memory might have emerged as a by-product of perception and
its semantic decoding. We propose that semantic memory does not only provide world knowledge, it
also defines the prior distribution for triple statements.
In this paper, we focus on sentences in the form of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples. The first
reason is that, in most languages, basic facts are expressed in SPO format and thus triple statements are
arguable of fundamental relevance. A second reason is that a whole knowledge base of SPO sentences
can be described as a knowledge graph, where the entities in the sentences are nodes and predicates
become labeled directed links pointing from subject node to object node. Knowledge graphs are universal
in the sense that statements involving predicates with an arity larger than two can be reduced to triple
formats.
Knowledge graphs currently have a large impact in applications and industry. The most promi-
nent example is the Google Knowledge Graphs with currently on the order of 100B triples (Singhal,
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2012). Further popular large-scale knowledge graphs are DBpedia (Auer et al., 2007), YAGO (Suchanek,
Kasneci, & Weikum, 2007), Freebase (Bollacker, Evans, Paritosh, Sturge, & Taylor, 2008), and NELL
(Carlson et al., 2010).
Knowledge graphs can be described by their adjacency tensors. Due to their large scale, it is infeasi-
ble to directly work with tensors, but one can work with tensor models, instead (Nickel, Murphy, Tresp,
& Gabrilovich, 2015). We define tensor models to be mappings from indices to index embeddings, which
are then mapped to real numbers. We believe that indices and their embeddings are essential concepts
for understanding the working of the brain.
We propose that an embedding-based implementation of tensor models for perception and memory,
under some constraints imposed by biology, requires four important layers. First, the sensory memory
layer, which is a buffer that maintains a representation of scene information. Second, the representation
layer, which is the brain’s main communication platform (“theater of the brain”). Third, the index layer,
which indexes the individual’s acquired concepts and time instances. Finally, complex semantic decoding
requires a memory function, which is supplied by the working memory layer. The model can realize
perception, including the generation of triple statements for scene descriptions, as well as episodic and
semantic memory.
From a biological point of view, the representation layer might be part of the posterior hot zone,
which, as it as been argued, is the minimal neural substrate essential for conscious perception (Koch,
Massimini, Boly, & Tononi, 2016). In conjunction with working memory, one might relate it to the
prefrontal parietal network (PPN), which has been argued to be a basis for consciousness (Bor & Seth,
2012), and the global workspace (Baars, 1997; Dehaene, 2014).
Complex semantic decoding of perceptual input and memory thus is a layered sequential process,
in which the embeddings of decoded concepts are communicated to the brain, as a whole. A set of
decoded triple statements, including triples from semantic memory and episodic memory, might lead
to an integrated representation that permits refined decision making by the agent: The agent does not
only understand better — due to memory recall, it also acts better! We analyze how memories can be
queried by a stochastic sampling process, which leads to a generative model, we actually propose to be
implemented in biology. In operation, we produce sampled triples. The importance of sampling has
been discussed by (Dehaene, 2014) in the context of conscious perception. For example, he states that
“... consciousness is a slow sampler”.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we cover related work. In Section 3 we
introduce knowledge graphs, their adjacency tensors, and tensor models. We distinguish between the
common static knowledge graph, the temporal knowledge graph, and the probabilistic knowledge graph.
In Section 4 we discuss a stochastic serialization of knowledge graphs by a sampling process. Section 5
presents some modeling details and discusses supervised and self-supervised learning. In Section 6 we
discuss an architecture that obeys some constraints imposed by information processing in the brain. A
reader only interested in the actual model might directly jump to this section. The architecture assumes
the form of a special recurrent neural network and actual implementations are described in the appendix.
In Section 7 we relate our model to current discussions in cognition and neuroscience. We also extend our
model to include an episodic memory. In Section 8 we describe experimental results using benchmark
data sets. Section 9 contains our conclusions.
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2 Related Work
2.1 Tensor Models for Knowledge Graphs
RESCAL was the first tensor-based embedding model for triple prediction in relational data sets and
knowledge graphs (Nickel, Tresp, & Kriegel, 2011, 2012). Before that, tensor factorization was applied
to retrieval and ranking (Franz, Schultz, Sizov, & Staab, 2009). Embedding learning for knowledge
graphs evolved into a sprawling research area (Bordes, Usunier, Garcia-Duran, Weston, & Yakhnenko,
2013; Socher, Chen, Manning, & Ng, 2013; B. Yang, Yih, He, Gao, & Deng, 2014; Nickel, Rosasco, &
Poggio, 2015; Trouillon, Welbl, Riedel, Gaussier, & Bouchard, 2016; Dettmers, Minervini, Stenetorp, &
Riedel, 2018). (Nickel, Murphy, et al., 2015) provides an overview.
2.2 Cognitive Tensor Models and Related Models
The line of work described in this paper started with (Tresp, Esteban, Yang, Baier, & Krompaß, 2015).
That paper introduced tensor models with index embeddings for perception, as well as semantic and
episodic memory. The paper does not contain a biologically plausible implementation of the tensor
models and also does not contain experiments.
(Tresp & Ma, 2016; Tresp, Ma, & Baier, 2017; Tresp, Ma, Baier, & Yang, 2017; Ma, Tresp, &
Daxberger, 2018) analyzed the connection between temporal, episodic and semantic tensor models. In
those papers, the temporal knowledge graph was modeled by a Bernoulli likelihood function, from which
semantic memory was derived by an integration step, performed in latent space. In this paper, we define
models for conditional categorical probabilities, which permits the efficient sampling of triples and also
the integration of visual input.
In 2016, the Stanford Visual Relationship dataset was published which contained images annotated
with triple statements (Lu, Krishna, Bernstein, & Fei-Fei, 2016). (Baier, Ma, & Tresp, 2017) showed
how a prior distribution derived from triple occurrences could significantly improve on pure vision-based
approaches and on approaches that used prior distributions derived from language models. (Sharifzadeh,
Berrendorf, & Tresp, 2019) showed further improvements by including 3-D image information. (Tresp,
Sharifzadeh, & Konopatzki, 2019) is a short paper that describes an earlier version of the model described
in this paper.
Tensor decomposition has been used previously as memory models but the main focus was on simple
associations (Hintzman, 1984; Kanerva, 1988; Humphreys, Bain, & Pike, 1989; Osth & Dennis, 2015)
and compositional structures (Smolensky, 1990; Pollack, 1990; Plate, 1997; Halford, Wilson, & Phillips,
1998; Ma, Hildebrandt, Baier, & Tresp, 2018). In the tensor product approach (Smolensky, 1990),
encoding or binding is realized by a tensor product (generalized outer product), and composition by
tensor addition. In the STAR model (Halford et al., 1998), predicates are represented as tensor products
of the components of the predicates. None of these approaches define an optimization step for tensor
factorization but have some form of factor design, instead, e.g., by using random vectors as embeddings.
Recent developments (Schlag & Schmidhuber, 2018) have shown that tensor product representations
with learnable embeddings, instead of random embeddings, can be profitably combined with recurrent
neural networks to express the combinatorial representation of sequential data. Further developments
of the tensor product approach demonstrated that tensor product decomposition networks with trainable
filler-role pairs can improve on recurrent neural network encoders (McCoy, Linzen, Dunbar, & Smolen-
sky, 2018).
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2.3 Scene Graphs
Triple statements generated from an image form a scene graph (Johnson et al., 2015). Work on scene
graphs attempts to find a unique, and globally optimal, interpretation of an image. The modern work
on scene graphs started with (Lu et al., 2016) and (Krishna et al., 2017). The two papers made their
annotated data available, which spawned an explosion in research. The first papers addressed visual
relation detection (Baier et al., 2017; Zhang, Kyaw, Chang, & Chua, 2017; Baier, Ma, & Tresp, 2018).
State-of-the-art scene graph models are described in (J. Yang, Lu, Lee, Batra, & Parikh, 2018; Zellers,
Yatskar, Thomson, & Choi, 2018; Hudson & Manning, 2019). The background information in (Lu et
al., 2016) was extracted from a text corpus. Recent work in this direction is (Luo, Zhang, Han, & Yang,
2019).
In the work presented in this paper, the focus is on chatterbox decoding, which produces a set of
triples. Global consistency is reflected in shared representations. Arguments for the chatterbox approach
are that, first, consistency on the level of the extracted triple statements could be addressed by a later
processing stage, second, the agent’s real-life video might change too fast to permit the analysis of a
static scene graph, and third, biologically plausible implementations of scene graph models would add
a lot of model complexity. The focus of this paper is on the simplest possible models satisfying our
biological and technical constraints. By chaining the decoding, dependencies between triples can further
be increased. Scene graphs are discussed again in Section 7.
2.4 Related Modern Technical Models for Memory
(Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) convincingly demonstrated the importance of memory systems in
recurrent neural networks. Important later extensions were the neural Turing machine (NTMs) (Graves,
Wayne, & Danihelka, 2014) and the memory networks (Weston, Chopra, & Bordes, 2014). In those
approaches, episodic memory acts as a memory buffer for training recurrent neural networks and for
reinforcement learning.
2.5 Dual Process Theory
In psychology, dual process theory concerns the interplay in the mental processing of an implicit, auto-
matic, unconscious process (shared with animals) and an explicit, controlled, conscious process (uniquely
human). See (Evans, 2003) for a review. One instance is Kahneman’s system-1 / system-2 dichotomy
(Kahneman, 2011).
CLARION is a dual-process model of both implicit and explicit learning (Sun & Peterson, 1996). It
is based on one-shot explicit rule learning (i.e., explicit learning) and gradual implicit tuning (i.e. implicit
learning).
In our model, the implicit side would be on the level of embeddings and representations, whereas the
explicit side is on the level of the concept indices and the extracted triple statements.
A recent approach is (Bengio, 2017). Although it addresses similar issues as our work, the approach
is quite different with a focus on explicit sparse factor graphs. See the discussion in Section 7.
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2.6 The Bayesian Brain
Our approach is in the tradition of Bayesian approaches to brain modeling (Dayan, Hinton, Neal, &
Zemel, 1995; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Ko¨rding, Ku, & Wolpert, 2004; Tenenbaum,
Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006; Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008; Friston, 2010).
In (Baier et al., 2017) an explicit semantic prior distribution was used, describing a priori probabili-
ties for triple statements. For inference, Bayes’ formula is used. The great improvement in performance
after integrating the prior information is an indication that triple representations might be a powerful
abstraction level for formulating prior information.
In the approach presented here, we assume that semantic memory defines a prior distribution which
is conjugate to the implicit likelihood function, in the sense that the posterior sampling distribution and
the prior sampling distribution can be described by the same basis. We do not explicitly apply Bayes’
formula. Instead, we have a shared representation for prior and posterior distributions.
3 Knowledge Graphs and their Adjacency Tensors
3.1 The Static Knowledge Graph KGstatic
We consider a world consisting of a set of NE entities E = {e1, . . . ,eNE} and a set of NP relation types
or predicates P = {p1, . . . , pNP}.1 We are interested in triple statements of the form (s, p,o) where s ∈ E
is the identifier for the subject entity, p ∈ P is the identifier for the predicate, and o ∈ E is the identifier
for the object entity. Examples for triple statements are: (Munich, partOf, Bavaria), (AkiraKurosawa,
directorOf, SevenSamurai), (Jack, knows, Mary), (Jack, type, Person), (Jack, height, Tall), and (Jack,
age, Young). In a static knowledge graph, KGstatic, the entities are the nodes and a true triple statement is
indicated by a directed link from s to o, labeled by p∈P . See Figure 1A. We write, KGstatic⊆E×P×E .
We can describe KGstatic as a third order tensor:
Definition 1 The triples in the static knowledge graph KGstatic can be grouped as a third-order adjacency
tensor Ystatic ∈ {0,1}NE×NP×NE , whose entries are set such that
ys,p,o =
{
1, if the triple (s, p,o) exists
0, otherwise.
It is a function, E ×P ×E →{0,1}.
In applications, the majority of currently employed KGs are static KGs. Since a static KG is about facts
that are either true of false, we consider it a Boolean KG.
But what is indeed true? We assume that there is a ground truth oracle which returns true, or 1, for all
true triple statements and otherwise 0. True triple statements can have a scientific character, like “Earth
revolves around the sun” or human conventions like “Munich is part of Bavaria”. For practical purposes,
we might consider a true sentence as a statement where the majority of domain experts would agree
that it is true. Triple statements where the oracle returns a 0 are considered false, as “Munich is part of
Belgium” (closed-world assumption) or as triples with unknown truth values (open-world assumption).
1Entities can, e.g., be persons, objects, locations. Later in the discussion, entities will stand for general concepts.
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Figure 1: A: A triple in the static KG, which states that Jack knows Mary. B: A triple of the temporal
KG. Jack looks at Mary at a time instance t. C: A triple of the probabilistic KG. Jack looks at Mary at
any time with probability γJack, looksAt, Mary. D: Triple generating process for the probabilistic KG: Jack
is the subject with probability P(S = J). Mary is the subject with probability P(S = M). Mary is the
object when Jack is the subject with probability P(O = M|S = J). If Jack is the subject and Mary is the
object, then the probability that Jack looks at Mary is P(P= looksAt|S= J,O=M). E: Same but with an
additional nonvisual predicate “livesIn” and nodes for entities (Jack, Mary), a class (Person), a location
(Munich), and an attribute (Happy).
We exclude statements that are ill-posed or cannot be formulated in triple format. This restriction on
simple true facts made knowledge graphs a success in many applications.
The static KG can be related to a brain’s semantic memory, since it is about facts, an agent assumes
to be true.
3.2 The Temporal Knowledge Graph KGtemp
Most knowledge graphs, which have been developed in the past, are static and reflect triple statements
which are stable in time. In reality, of course, the state of the world is changing: a healthy person
becomes diagnosed with a disease and a new president is inaugurated. This can be described by temporal
knowledge graphs. See Figure 1B.
Consider time instances T = {t1, . . . , tNT }. The KG at time instance t ∈ T , KGt , contains the set of
all triples that are true at time instance t and we write (s, p,o)t ∈ KGt , with t = 1, . . . ,NT . Thus, KGt
describes the state of the world at time instance t. Whereas the static KG would formulate that (s, p, o)
is a true sentence independent of the time instance, the temporal KG would formulate that (s, p, o) is a
true sentence at time instance t.
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The temporal knowledge graph KGtemp is simply the set of all KGt . KGtemp can display different
temporal patterns. “Surprising” patterns are singular events (“signing of a peace treaty”). An event
might indicate a state transition, e.g., before the signing of a peace treaty (the event), a country was at
war, and afterward, it was at peace. Memorable events play a particular role in episodic memory. Thus,
in addition to static triples, the temporal KGtemp at time instance t contains triples, e.g., for the singular
events (Jack, diagnosed, Diabetes), (Jack, getsInjection, MeaslesVaccine), (Jack, looksAt, Mary).
Definition 2 The triples in the temporal knowledge graph KGtemp can be grouped as a fourth-order
adjacency tensor Ytemp ∈ {0,1}NE×NP×NE×NT , whose entries are set such that
ys,p,o,t =
{
1, if the triple (s, p, o) is true at time instance t
0, otherwise.
It is a function, E ×P ×E ×T →{0,1}.
A temporal KG is also a Boolean KG. An agent’s KGtemp could be related to an ideal episodic memory,
which can recover the state of the world, respectively significant events, at any time in the past (see
Section 7).
3.3 The Probabilistic Knowledge Graph KGprob
In a simple generative model for KGtemp, we assume that the truth values of triple statements are gener-
ated by independent Bernoulli distributions. Thus, with 0≤ γs,p,o ≤ 1,
P(ys,p,o,t = 1) = γs,p,o. (1)
If γs,p,o = 1, the triple is known to be always true (and would be part of the static KG), if γs,p,o = 0, the
triple is known to be never true, and if 0 < γs,p,o < 1, then γs,p,o indicates the proportion of times that
the triple is known to be true. An example for the first case would be (Munich, locatedIn, Bavaria), the
second case (Munich, locatedIn, Netherlands), and the last case, (Munich, hasTemperature, Hot).
We can introduce the probabilistic knowledge graph, KGprob, where we attach the weight γs,p,o to the
labeled links (Figure 1C). We can define the corresponding adjacency tensor:
Definition 3 The triples in the probabilistic knowledge graph KGprob can be grouped as a third-order
adjacency tensor Γprob with entries γs,p,o. We refer to this as the adjacency tensor for KGprob. It is a
function, E ×P ×E → [0,1].
Equation 1 describes a generative model for the temporal knowledge graph KGtemp. Thus in our
modeling assumption, γs,p,o is the probability that ys,p,o,t = 1 prior to (or without) any observation at time
instance t. By defining a prior distribution, we can also interpret γs,p,o as the agent’s personal belief that
the triple statement (s, p, o) is true in the next instance in time.
Since γs,p,o ≈ Et(ys,p,o,t), it is clear that we can obtain an estimate of the probabilistic KG adjacency
tensor as an average of the temporal KG adjacency tensor.
As discussed in Section 7, the probabilistic KG can also be related to a brain’s semantic memory.
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3.4 Tensor Models with Index Embeddings
To achieve scalable solutions, and to improve the accuracy of estimates, we employ parameterized mod-
els. Standard tensor decompositions are described by multilinear maps.2 We generalize this concept to
general nonlinear maps. In particular, we define a model for a third-order tensor with index embeddings
in the following way:
Definition 4 A model for a third-order tensor with index embeddings is a function (as,ap,ao) 7→ f (as,ap,ao),
where as,ap,ao are vectors of real numbers and are called factors, representations, or embeddings for
the entity s, predicate p, and entity o, respectively.
A generalization to tensors with an order other than three is straightforward. We consider tensor models,
where, e.g., a neural network might be used to model fprobw (·). In that case, w would be the parameters in
the neural network.
As an example, we can obtain a model for the probabilistic KG as P(ys,p,o,t = 1) = sig(fw(as,ap,ao)),
where sig is the logistic function. In this paper, we do not employ tensor models for KGs directly:
Instead, we derive tensor models for describing conditional probabilities in stochastic serializations of
KGs, as described next.
4 Stochastic Serialization of Knowledge Graphs and Perception
In the following, we are concerned with an agent’s knowledge and belief, instead of ground truth facts.
Thus, the Boolean KGstatic, KGtemp and the probabilistic KGprob, directly relate to an agent’s belief about
facts in the real world, i.e., to triples that an agent knows or believes to be either true or false. We propose
that human memory recall is an active process by which triples are generated in a sampling process: Thus
it is not sufficient to have a memory, the memory needs to communicate content. In Section 5 we are
also concerned with the inverse process: when and how do generated triples refer to statements, the agent
considers true.
Next, we can serialize the knowledge graphs and derive triple generating processes.
4.1 A Triple Generating Process for the Static and the Probabilistic Knowledge Graph
For KGstatic we define a categorical distribution
P(S = s,P = p,O = o) =
ys,p,o
∑s,p,o ys,p,o
. (2)
By sampling from this distribution, we randomly generate true triples. By the last equation, we have
transformed a knowledge graph into a probabilistic model! We can also consider the reverse direction:
If the sampling process generates a triple, we can consider it to be an element of KGstatic. Similarly, we
can derive a P(S = s,P = p,O = o,T = t) for the temporal KG.
2An example for a multilinear tensor factorization model is RESCAL (Nickel et al., 2011), with fprobw (as,ap,ao) =
aTo matrix(ap)as where matrix(·) transforms the vector into a square matrix. Multilinearity means, e.g., that the decomposi-
tion is linear in as, when ao and ap are fixed.
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We can also define
P(S = s,P = p,O = o) =
γs,p,o
∑s,p,o γs,p,o
(3)
and we could generate triples with a high likelihood under the probabilistic KG.
4.2 Forward Sampling
Using the chain rule (a.k.a. the general product rule), we can decompose
P(S = s,P = p,O = o) = P(S = s) P(O = o|S = s) P(P = p|S = s,O = o).
We can now easily generate samples by ancestral sampling, a.k.a. forward sampling: First we generate
an s∗ from P(S), then an o∗ from P(O|S = s∗), and then a p∗ from P(P|S = s∗,O = o∗).
Thus the content in the static KG is represented by a triple-generating process, which produces se-
quences of triples that are elements of the static KG! A similar process can be generated for the temporal
KG.
4.3 A Triple Generating Process for Perception
In this section we only consider predicates with visual groundings, like nextTo, looksAt, inFrontOf. These
are relevant for perception. At time instance t, the agent focuses on three image bounding boxes, which
were selected by an attention mechanism.3 We assume a bounding box for a subject BBsub which contains
entity S, a bounding box for an object BBobj which contains entity O, and a bounding box for a predicate
BBpred specific to predicate P. See Figure 2 (image from (Lu et al., 2016)). In perception, we are not as
much interested in all triple statements that are true at time instance t, but in the ones which the agent
can infer to be true, given the observed scene at time instance t. Another view would be to infer the set
of true triples that are causes for the scene.
Definition 5 A triple-generating process for perception is defined by the conditional probabilities4
P(S = s|BBsub,BBpred,BBobj) (4)
P(O = o|S = s,BBsub,BBpred,BBobj) (5)
P(P = p|O = o,S = s,BBsub,BBpred,BBobj). (6)
As discussed before, this decomposition permits forward sampling, and, if the perception system has low
uncertainty, the sampled triples can conceptionally be added to the temporal KG.
4.4 Tensor Models with Index Embeddings
We derive tensor models with index embeddings directly for the probabilistic decompositions.
3The details on this attention mechanisms are not the topic of this paper. In the experiments, we use faster R-CNN (Ren,
He, Girshick, & Sun, 2015).
4Among natural languages with a word order preference, (s, o, p) is the most common type (Crystal, 1997). This order
works best for us since s and o can be predicted with some certainty in most images, whereas p is more of a challenge.
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Figure 2: Image and a triple of bounding boxes. Extracted triples could be (Person, nextTo, Surfboard)
and (Jack, nextTo, Surfboard).
Perception’s Triple Generating Processes
A tensor model involved in perception (Equation 6) is
P(P = p|S = s,O = o,BBsub,t ,BBpred,t ,BBobj,t) = exp f
pred
w (as,ap,ao,at)
∑p exp f
pred
w (as,ap,ao,at)
(7)
≡ softmaxP( f predw (as,ap,ao,at))
where f predw (as,ap,ao,at) is a fourth-order tensor model and where at is the latent representation for time
instance t.
For our purposes, we assume that at is a concatenation of representations derived from the bounding
boxes,
at = [a(BBsub,t);a(BBpred,t);a(BBobj,t)]. (8)
Note that the term embedding is preferably used for latent vectors that are static and are tied to concepts
(and later are described by connection weights), whereas the term latent representations is preferably
used for latent vectors that are, e.g., calculated as functions of sensory inputs.
We share embeddings and latent representations in the conditional probabilities and define
P(S = s|BBsub,t ,BBpred,t ,BBobj,t) = softmaxS(fsubw (as,at)) (9)
P(O = o|S = s,BBsub,t ,BBpred,t ,BBobj,t) = softmaxO(fobjw (as,ao,at)) (10)
P(P = p|S = s,O = o,BBsub,t ,BBpred,t ,BBobj,t) = softmaxP(fpredw (as,ap,ao,at)). (11)
In our proposed model, the equations are implemented in form of a special recurrent neural network. See
Section 6 and Figure 5 in the appendix.
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Triple Sampling Process for the Probabilistic KG
We now propose to use the same functions with the same w, i.e., fsubw (·), fobjw (·), and fpredw (·), for sampling
from the probabilistic KG. Firstly, model sharing is a good idea in general, since it can lead to better
generalization, and secondly, from a biological point of view, it would be wasteful to have separate
models for semantic memory and for perception.
We obtain,
P(S = s) = softmaxS(fsubw (as, a¯)) (12)
P(O = o|S = s) = softmaxO(fobjw (as,ao, a¯)) (13)
P(P = p|S = s,O = o) = softmaxP(fpredw (as,ap,ao, a¯)). (14)
The first line is the conditional probability for the subject, the second one for the object, given the subject,
and the last one for the predicate, given the subject and the object.
In the transition from Equations 9, 10, 11 to Equations 12, 13, 14 we substituted
at → a¯ (15)
where a¯ is the time-invariant probabilistic KG embedding vector, learned from data. In a biological
interpretation a¯ becomes the semantic memory embedding (see Section 7). The underlying (reasonable)
assumption is that both the probabilistic model and the perception model can use the same basis, thus in
this sense, the probabilistic KG model (i.e., the semantic memory) is a conjugate prior distribution for
the perception model.
The triple sampling process for the probabilistic KG is related to the perceptual process. Thus the
underlying γs,p,o would the proportion of times that (s, p,o) can be extracted from the image and not the
proportion of times that (s, p,o) is true, as defined before.
5 Implementation Details
5.1 Perception Beyond Entities
So far, we considered graph nodes to be entities. Now we extend the model such that a node can stand
for a general concept, e.g., an entity, a class, an attribute, or a location (Figure 1E). Thus the bounding
box, e.g., for the subject, only contains one thing, but this thing can have different labels, like Jack or
Person or Happy.
Sampled triple statements from a fixed triple of bounding boxes, e.g., might now be (Jack, looksAt,
Mary), (Person, looksAt, Mary), (Jack, looksAt, Person), (Person, looksAt, Person), (Happy, looksAt,
Mary), (Happy, looksAt, Blond), and so on.
Recall, that we associate a time instance t with a bounding box triple. This is important such that,
e.g., the triple (Happy, looksAt, Mary) is meaningful and can be associated with the correct bounding
boxes.
5.2 Chatterbox Decoding
Clearly, sampling might also produce semantically contradicting sentences. As an example, if for the
same three bounding boxes the model generates the triples (Jack, looksAt, Mary), (Person, looksAt,
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Mary) and (Dog, looksAt, Mary), then the agent would not catch this semantic contradiction. It would
simply conclude that Jack has properties “person” and “dog”. Our approach does not check for semantic
conflicts on the declarative sentence level. We continue this discussion in more detail in Section 7.
5.3 Properties and a Simple Semantic Decoder
If s∗1 and s
∗
2 are two samples for the same bounding box, the agent concludes that (s
∗
1, hasProperty,
s∗2) is true. For example, if Jack is a label for a bounding box, and Happy is a label for the same
bounding box, then the agent concludes that (Jack, hasProperty, Happy) is true and, conceptionally, the
fact is entered in KGtemp. Other examples are, (Jack, hasProperty, Person), (Jack, hasProperty, Happy),
(Mary, hasProperty, Blond). As a postprocessing step, hasProperty can be mapped to more meaningful
predicates with a representation in the schema. Thus, e.g., (Mary, hasProperty, Blond) becomes (Mary,
hasHaircolor, Blond) and (Jack, hasProperty, Person) becomes (Jack, hasClass, Person).
For this decoding of properties, a simple decoder is sufficient. The agent only needs to repeatedly
sample from the same bounding box, let’s say the subject, using Equation 4, and generate several bound-
ing box labels. We discuss simple decoding in more detail in Section 7.
5.4 From a Bag of Samples to a Set of Facts for the Temporal KG
Assume that, in ground truth, a bounding box triple is described by Ns true sentences. If we generate a
bag of N >> Ns samples {s∗i , p∗i ,o∗i }Ni=1, using Equations 9, 10 and 11, and remove multiple instances of
the same samples, we recover a subset of the true triples. There is a trade-off: If N is selected too small,
we might miss some of the true triples and if we select N to be too large, we also produce erroneous
triples. Generated triple sets will be used to train the perceptual system and the probabilistic KG, as
described next.
5.5 Machine Learning for Perception
Supervised Learning for Perception
The training data targets are represented in the adjacency tensor for the temporal knowledge graph.
Assume that at time instance t∗, a true observed triple is (s∗,o∗, p∗). Its contribution to the cross entropy
cost function for the perceptual model is then
costperc,s∗,p∗,o∗,t∗ =
− logsoftmaxS(fsubw (as∗ ,at∗))− logsoftmaxO(fobjw (as∗ ,ao∗ ,at∗))− logsoftmaxP(fpredw (as∗ ,ap∗ ,ao∗ ,at∗))
with the decomposition in Equations 9, 10, and 11.
Self-supervised Learning for Perception
In self-supervised learning, without labeled examples, we use exactly the same cost function, only that
(s∗,o∗, p∗) is a sample generated in the perception sampling using Equations 9, 10 and 11 and with
the removal of multiple copies, as described in Section 5.4. This form of self-supervised learning can be
considered a form of Monte Carlo EM (Wei & Tanner, 1990), where the Monte Carlo E-step corresponds
13
to the generation of the samples, and the maximization step to the gradient update, taking the samples as
actual data.
5.6 Machine Learning for the Probabilistic KG
We now consider the adaptation of the probabilistic KG embedding vector a¯ (introduced in Equation 15).
If (s∗, p∗,o∗) is a training triple at time instance t∗,
costprob,s∗,p∗,o∗,t∗ =
− logsoftmaxS(fsubw (as∗ , a¯))− logsoftmaxO(fobjw (as∗ ,ao∗ , a¯))− logsoftmaxP(fpredw (as∗ ,ap∗ ,ao∗ , a¯))
with the decomposition in Equations 12, 13, and 14.
For visual triples, the learned probabilities are all w.r.t. the perceptual process. E.g., for semantic
memory, the conditional probabilities are prior probabilities: P(S= John) is the prior probability that the
next sample generated from the subject bounding box refers to John, P(O = Mary|S = John) is the prior
probability that the next sample generated from the object bounding box refers to Mary if the subject
bounding box sample was John, and P(P = looksAt|S = John,O = Mary) is the prior probability that
the next sample generated from the predicate bounding box refers to looksAt if the subject bounding box
sample was John and the object bounding box sample was Mary.
In operation, we can train the probabilistic KG in a self-supervised manner with the samples gener-
ated from perception, as well.
Self-supervised learning can also be performed using triples generated by the probabilistic KG. In
particular, this is important for the triples in the probabilistic KG that are shared with the static KG,
typically related to background information. For example, (Jack, looksAt, Mary) might be a visual
triple statement and (Jack,sibling,Mary) is a background triple statement, which might not have been
acquired by visual perception. Since these triples are ”true forever“ they should be sampled regularly in
self-supervised training, and used in the adaptation of the probabilistic KG, to avoid forgetting.5
Some predicates might have two representations: E.g., “hairColor” might appear as “hairColorOb-
served” in perception and “hairColorTrue” in background.
6 Towards a Cognitive Architecture
6.1 From KGs and Tensors to Perception and Semantic Memory
We now begin relating the technical model to human perception and memory. First, we propose that
the triple generation process in our perception model can be related to human perception. Second, we
propose that the triple generation process for our probabilistic KG can be related to human semantic
memory.
6.2 Biological Constraints
We now consider implementations of the developed equations for perceptual decoding. Standard tensor
models with index embeddings cannot easily be implemented in brainware. First, most tensor factoriza-
tions, such as the canonical polyadic decomposition, the Tucker decomposition and RESCAL, require
5In the experiments, the background probabilistic KG is a separate categorical model with its own a¯bg.
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the excessive multiplication of factors; multiplication is an operation that is not easily implemented in bi-
ological hardware. Second, tensor models are functions of several embedding vectors and, following our
single brain hypothesis (discussed in Section 7), only one thing at a time can be represented in the brain’s
representation layer (see Figure 3). This results in the need for an extra memory layer, i.e., the working
memory. Third, for processing speed, we propose that there needs to be a direct path from sensory input
to concept prediction, without a detour through a memory layer. The contribution of the memory layer
to concept prediction should be a modification of this direct prediction path. Fourth, we also need to
take into account the sequential nature of the processing, so processing must proceed forward in time. A
detailed analysis of our model in the context of current discussions in cognition and neuroscience follows
in Section 7.
6.3 Overall Architecture
We propose that a minimal implementation of a perceptual sampling process, following Equations 9, 10,
and 11, under the discussed biologically motivated constraints, requires the layers shown in Figure 3. The
central communication platform is the representation layer q. It receives information about the visual
input provided by the sensory memory layer g. The index layer e contains the indices for concepts.
The representation layer can activate the indices and vice versa. To be able to decode triples, and for
memory functions in general, we introduce the working memory layer h. It receives input from the
representation layer and also transmits information back to the representation layer. Layer h has self-
recurrent connections.
6.4 Processing Steps
We first consider the decoding of the subject. The simplest implementation of Equation 9 is as follows.
Let g describe the output of the visual processing system. We implement the visual processing system
by a deep neural network mapping where the input is the subject bounding box BBsub. By connection
matrix D, this information activates the representation layer q, which then activates layer e via connection
weights AT . The i-th column of matrix A consists of the embedding vector aei .
Now we sample from the ensuing categorical distribution (Equation 9) and the brain makes a com-
mitment to a unique interpretation, by selecting a sample s∗. The selected s∗ activates the representation
layer as q := as∗ , and, by this activation of the representation layer, the complete brain is informed about
the selected entity.
We essentially repeat the procedure also for the object, Equation 10, and the predicate, Equation 11.
But now we need to involve the working memory layer h. This layer stores anything that has been going
on in the representation layer so far and it contributes this information back to the representation layer.
Thus for the object, the representation layer is activated by visual input from BBobj via the deep neural
network, and from the working memory layer h via connection matrix W . Again, the representation layer
then activates layer e via connection weights AT . We sample an o∗ and we then set, q := ao∗ .
We proceed similarly for the predicate, only that the visual input now is coming from BBpred. We
sample a p∗ and we then set, q := ap∗ .
After decoding an (s∗, p∗,o∗)-sample, we can do another pass through the working memory, which
integrates information about the triple and can also serve as initialization for follow-up triple decoding,
15
Figure 3: Our model architecture consists of four layers. Extracted representations from images are
represented at the bottom layer activating the sensory memory, g. This layer is connected to the repre-
sentation layer q. The top layer e contains the indices for entities and predicates. The working memory
h is a short term memory. The dotted segment includes the time indices et of episodic memory and the
semantic memory index e¯ for semantic memory. See Section 7.
providing context. The representation layer finally is a representation of the complete decoded triple
sentence.
A detailed description of a concrete implementation can be found in the appendix. See, in particular,
Figure 5. Although the architecture is related to the decoder in encoder-decoder architectures used in
machine translation (Cho et al., 2014), there are also significant differences, mainly due to the fact that
we insist on a direct path from sensory input to concept prediction. Figure 3 also includes indices for
time instances, which are important for episodic memory and an index e¯ for episodic memory. Sampling
e¯ would activate the representation layer with memory embedding vector a¯, and the model produces
samples from the semantic memory. See our discussion in Section 7 and Figure 5 in the appendix.
7 Relationships to Information Processing in the Brain
In this section, we relate our model to current discussions in cognition and neuroscience. Main points
are formulated as propositions. A speculative assignment of the model layers to brain areas is shown in
Figure 4.
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sFigure 4: There is still great uncertainty about the localization of the different functions in the brain.
Here is one plausible allocation. The model’s layer g would correspond to the visuospatial sketchpad
in the parietal-occipital region. The model’s index layer e would correspond to indices formed in the
medial temporal lobe (MLT). Indices for concepts are consolidated in hubs like the anterior temporal lobe
(ATL). Some papers also see a greater role of the posterior parietal cortex, as part of a parietal memory
network (PMN). MTL and other structures, like the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), are involved in
the consolidation of episodic memories. Our working memory h is part of the brain’s working memory
which involves the prefrontal parietal network (PPN). The brain’s version of the representation layer q is
distributed across the neocortex, including sensory and motor centers.
7.1 Sensory Memory Layer and Sensor Encoding
In our model, we use a deep convolutional neural network for the mapping from the bounding boxes
to the visual sensory memory. The mapping of deep convolutional neural networks to the operations of
different brain regions —not discussed in this paper— is a focus of current research, e.g., (Kriegeskorte
& Douglas, 2018).
Layer g in our model would be related to the visual sensory memory, maintaining visual information
to be processed and analyzed, and it represents properties of the respective visual focus of attention. In the
brain, sensory memory (time scale of milliseconds to a second) represents the ability to retain impressions
of sensory information after the original stimuli have ended (Tulving, 1972; Coltheart, 1980; Gazzaniga,
Ivry, & Mangun, 2013). It is assumed that the visual sensory memory layer involves the visuospatial
sketchpad of the working memory, associated with the parietal-occipital region of the brain (Gazzaniga
et al., 2013).
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7.2 Concept Engrams
An engram is a memory trace in the brain. In this section, we focus on engrams for concepts such as en-
tities, classes, locations, and predicates, representing conceptual knowledge (Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson,
& Rogers, 2017). Engrams for episodic memory are discussed further down.
Proposition 1 In the brain, concept engrams are memory traces, e.g., for entities, classes, locations,
attributes, and predicates. In our model, an engram consists of a concept index e, realized by a unit in
the index layer e, and its concept embedding, which is realized as a connection vector ae connecting an
entity index e with the representation layer q.
Proposition 2 Since embeddings are optimized for their different roles in perception and memory, they
implicitly reflect all that is known about a concept. In the brain, embeddings would be a part of an
implicit concept memory, but they are also required for semantic decoding.
The concept index by itself has an amodal, local, symbolic character, whereas the embedding has a
modal, distributed character, and grounds the concept.
The debate about localized representations in the brain is ongoing; currently, there are many ex-
perimental results pointing towards locality (Kiefer & Pulvermu¨ller, 2012). As (Dehaene, 2014) puts
it: “Every cortical site holds its own specialized piece of knowledge”. In agreement with current dis-
cussions, we are favoring localized representations of concepts in the biological equivalent of the index
layer e and localized semantic interpretations in the representation layer q: (Binder & Desai, 2011)
states: “The neural systems specialized for storage and retrieval of semantic knowledge are widespread
and occupy a large proportion of the cortex in the human brain.”
Naturally, locality of representation is probably only discovered in well-designed experiments: In
our model, an activated concept index activates several units in the representation layer, and a unit in the
representation layer, in turn, activates many indices. Since index activations might change rapidly, the
general appearance might be that of a globally activated system, hiding locality of representation.
Specific concept cells have been found in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) region of the brain. MTL
includes the hippocampus, along with the surrounding hippocampal region consisting of the perirhinal,
parahippocampal, and entorhinal neocortical regions. In particular, researchers have reported on a re-
markable subset of MTL neurons that are selectively activated by strikingly different pictures of given
individuals, landmarks or objects, and in some cases even by letter strings with their names (Quiroga,
2012; Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2005).
We argue that the components or units in the biological realization of the representation layer q have
specific meanings as well. In different brain regions, maps have been discovered that code for visual
appearance, sound, and function. These regions would be the units in the biological equivalent of our
representation layer q and could be activated by the concept indices. For instance, the concept “cat”
includes the information that a cat has four legs, is furry, meows, can move or can be petted (Kiefer
& Pulvermu¨ller, 2012). As another example, consider the recall of the concept “hammer”, represented
in the index layer e (Rueschemeyer, van Rooij, Lindemann, Willems, & Bekkering, 2010). This might
excite brain areas indicating a typical hammer appearance, the sound of hammering and the required
motor movement of hammering, all represented in the biological equivalence of representation layer q.
In our model, since q is activated by visual input, the embeddings will mostly be visually grounded, as
well.
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Evidence for distributed semantic activation has, e.g., been described by (Huth, de Heer, Griffiths,
Theunissen, & Gallant, 2016). That paper developed a detailed atlas of semantic categories and their
topographic organization by extensive fMRI studies, showing the involvement of the lateral temporal
cortex, the ventral temporal cortex, the lateral parietal cortex, the medial parietal cortex, the medial
prefrontal cortex, the superior prefrontal cortex, and the inferior prefrontal cortex (Huth et al., 2016).
(Ralph et al., 2017) has defined a hub-and-spoke model. The hub is supposed to be located in the
anterior temporal lobes (ATLs), which might be where concept indices are consolidated after they are
formed in MTL. The hub is connected to several different areas (e.g., visual cortex, auditory cortex, or-
bitofrontal cortex), which might be part of the biological realization of the representation layer. Other
hubs have been located in the frontal, the temporal and the parietal lobe (Tomasello, Garagnani, Wen-
nekers, & Pulvermu¨ller, 2017).
For spatial memory, the posterior parietal cortex fulfills all criteria for a hippocampus-independent
memory representation (Brodt et al., 2016). Researchers also discuss a parietal memory network (PMN)
(Gilmore, Nelson, & McDermott, 2015).
Recently, evidence has been found that embeddings are context dependent (Popp, Trumpp, & Kiefer,
2019). In our model, the representation layer is activated by sensory input and by context indices, so
the model is informed about a concept in context, even with the connection weights between layers e
and q being fixed. The feedback from the working memory layer also represents context which affects
representations. Other mechanisms for realizing context-dependent representations in the brain could be
attention based in combination with context-specific concept indices.
In our model, we have a bipartite relationship between the concept index layer e and the represen-
tation layer q. The cortical network, in general, is not strictly bipartite and contains extensive local
connectivity, realizing an interplay of synaptic excitation and synaptic inhibition (Isaacson & Scanziani,
2011). Thus bipartiteness might not be true in the actual brain, but it might be a reasonable approximation
to biological reality. A specific entity has very specific embeddings, so strong links between an entity
index and associated nodes in the representation layer are quite plausible. Considering the diversity of
concepts, strong correlations among representation nodes might be rarer and learning might favor inde-
pendent representations (Hyvarinen, Cristescu, & Oja, 1999). Dependencies between concepts in our
model are mediated via activation of the representation layer. We would not exclude direct entity-entity
links, but again, they might be rare. The advantage of a purely bipartite architecture is interpretability
and speed of operation. Considering that in our model q was activated by visual input, the activation of
the concept indices then is simply the last layer in a classifier. Without a bipartite structure, decoding is
an iterative process requiring convergence to an equilibrium point, potentially using stochastic sampling,
as in the restricted Boltzmann machine (Smolensky, 1986; Hinton, 2010).
In the brain one typically encounters sparse distributed representations (Rolls, 2016). Sparsity in the
embedding vectors can be achieved in technical models, e.g., by using appropriate regularization terms,
like LASSO (Tibshirani, 1996). Sparsity can also be encouraged by enforcing nonnegativity of model
parameters.
In our model, the weights between e and q are symmetrical. The biological plausibility of symmetric
weights has been discussed intensely in computational neuroscience and many biologically oriented
models have that property. There is a significant amount of evidence that neural systems are bidirectional
in the sense that if a set of neurons is connected with another set of neurons, connections in the back-
direction also exist. But it is generally not assumed that connections are symmetrical, rather back-
projecting connections are typically less strong and numerous than forward connections (Rolls, 2016).
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In our model, we can relax the symmetry requirement: Symmetry makes sense, but it is not essential,
since we are not dependent on some fixed point stability, as other models (Hopfield, 1982; Hinton &
Salakhutdinov, 2006).
7.3 Cognitive Maps and Schemas
Cognitive maps are well established in spatial domains, as grid cells in the mammalian entorhinal cortex
(Rowland, Roudi, Moser, & Moser, 2016; Stachenfeld, Botvinick, & Gershman, 2014; Constantinescu,
O’Reilly, & Behrens, 2016). They encode the geometry of allocentric space with a periodic “grid” code
(Hassabis, Kumaran, Summerfield, & Botvinick, 2017). This grid-like code might also be present in
cortical regions as the medial frontal, the medial parietal and lateral temporal cortices, and possibly even
for nonspatial abstract conceptual representations (Constantinescu et al., 2016). Spatial memories, as
other memories, are thought to be slowly induced in the neocortex by a gradual recruitment of neocortical
memory circuits in long-term storage of hippocampal memories (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly,
1995; Squire & Alvarez, 1995; Frankland, O’Brien, Ohno, Kirkwood, & Silva, 2001; Moser, Rowland,
& Moser, 2015).
Representations for concepts form what is called a schema. (Moscovitch, Cabeza, Winocur, & Nadel,
2016) defines a schema as “adaptable associative networks of knowledge extracted over multiple similar
experiences”. Studies have shown that individuals can analyze perceptual information significantly more
easily when this information is related to an acquired schema.
In our model, an improvement in the concept schema would go hand in hand with a refined percep-
tion, whereas learning about new concepts would require considerable effort. Forming a new concept
means introducing a new concept index and learning an embedding for the new concept. This is related to
few-shot learning in technical systems (Snell, Swersky, & Zemel, 2017), but with unlabeled data, which
is a challenging problem.
Proposition 3 In our model, dealing with a new concept is much more involved than dealing with a
concept that already has an index and an embedding. In the first case, the model needs to realize that
there is a new concept, a new index needs to be formed, and a new embedding needs to be learned. These
three steps might also play a role in the brain when new concepts are formed.
Or, as the German writer Goethe put it: “We only see what we know”.
The cognitive sciences have a certain focus on concept structures. There is considerable work on
semantic networks (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Collins & Quillian, 2004), word net (Miller, 1998) and
formal domain ontologies (Staab & Studer, 2010). Topic models and mind maps are among the more
modern approaches.
In our approach, links between concepts are not stored explicitly but are calculated on-demand from
node embeddings, and information propagates via the representation layer. In our model, there are several
ways of analyzing concept structure. First, following our previous discussion, the concept representa-
tions projected to the representation layer q are visually grounded and should be interpretable. Second,
similarity between concepts can be analyzed by clustering in embedding space, as pursued by (Nickel,
Murphy, et al., 2015). Third, there are special embedding learning approaches that focus on hierarchical
concept structures in embedding models (Nickel & Kiela, 2017). Fourth, similarity between triple state-
ments can be found by an analysis of the integrated triple representations. This might be useful for the
discovery of triple correlations and causal dependencies.
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7.4 Representation Layer
Proposition 4 The representation layer would correspond to the brain’s main “communication plat-
form”, “communication bus“, “blackboard”, or the shared “canvas”, where it enables a global infor-
mation exchange. To convey information, both in our model and the brain, perception, and memory need
to activate this layer.
In our model, the representation layer can be activated by perception, semantic memory and, as we will
discuss further down, by episodic memory and communicates with sensory memory layer, index layer,
and working memory. As discussed, the biological equivalent of the representation layer involves diverse
areas, including the motor and association cortex.
In semantic decoding, the representation layer is periodically activated, which might be reflected in
neural signals and could be related to some of the neural oscillations found in the brain. A candidate is
the beta rhythm (13-35 Hz) considered to be related to consciousness, perception, and motor behavior.
Also of interest is the gamma wave (25-140 Hz), which is correlated with large scale brain network
activity and cognitive phenomena such as working memory, attention, and perceptual grouping.
The clear distinction between representation layer and index layer might be blurred in the brain: a
unit in the representation layer might sometimes act as an index and vice versa.
7.5 Semantic Decoding
The simple semantic decoder was introduced in Section 5.
Proposition 5 In our model and maybe also in the brain, a simple semantic decoder does not require
working memory. It is sufficient for decoding of sentences with unary predicates.
First and foremost, a simple decoder uses the direct path from sensory input to the index layer, so concept
classification is fast and does not do a detour through the working memory layer.
The simple decoder can associate several labels originating from the same bounding box. Thus it
can conclude that the bounding box represents Jack, and it represents something that is blond, so it must
be true that (Jack, hairColor, Blond). Here, the predicate-object pair can be represented by the unary
predicate hairColorBlond, since “Blond” does not have object characteristics. A triple with a binary
predicate would be (Jack, knows, Mary) which, as a relation, knows(Jack, Mary), has two arguments,
since Mary, as a person, does have object characteristics.
Proposition 6 A complex semantic decoder considers the dependencies between subject, object, and
predicate. In our model and, as we propose also in the brain, the complex semantic decoder requires
working memory and builds upon concept indices and concept embeddings.
As our experimental results will show, the complex decoder —in combination with the working memory
layer— gives much-improved results for decoding sentences with binary predicates. Thus we propose
that working memory greatly improves the ability of humans to formulate triple statements represent-
ing entity-to-entity relationships. To what degree animals have working memory functionalities is still
a matter of debate. (Carruthers, 2013) concludes that other primates have working memory systems
homologous with humans’, but that humans are unique in some of its uses, specifically of inner speech.
21
7.6 Working Memory Layer
A complex semantic decoder requires a memory function.
Proposition 7 Single brain hypothesis: in our model the representation layer q is memoryless and can
only present one thing at a time; any information that needs to be stored for later processing requires
working memory layer h. We suggest that also the brain needs to employ the working memory for any
short-term storage of information.
Deep neural networks process information in a sequence of layered parallel processing steps. The same
type of processing occurs in the complex semantic decoder, which activates a sequence of layers, in-
volving layers g,q,e,h, as part of a recurrent structure to produce a sequence of concept indices (see
Figures 3 and 5).
Proposition 8 In the semantic decoder, processing is executed as a sequence of layered parallel steps,
activating a sequence of concept indices.
Sequential processing is also a core concept in the theory of a global workspace (Baars, 1997; Bor &
Seth, 2012; Dehaene, 2014): (Koch, 2014) discusses that Dehaene’s workspace has extremely limited
capacity (“the central bottleneck”) and that the mind can be conscious of only one or a few items or
events, although these might be quickly varying. In cognitive neuroscience, the general notion is that
multitasking likely is an illusion. The sequential processing would also contribute to a potential solution
of the binding problem (Singer, 2001), since the decoding focuses on concepts in a serial fashion and
associations between activities in the representation layer and the index layer are well defined.
In general, working memory is associated with decision making and cognitive control (A. Badde-
ley, 1992) and is necessary for keeping task-relevant information active as well as manipulating that
information to accomplish behavioral tasks. There is an emerging consensus that most working mem-
ory tasks recruit a network of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and parietal areas in the prefrontal parietal
network (PPN). PPN activity is consistently reported in both attention and consciousness studies (Bor
& Seth, 2012). The latter publication proposes that the PPN can be viewed as a “core correlate” of
consciousness.
(Dehaene, 2014) defines consciousness as “global information sharing” where information has en-
tered into a specific storage area that makes it available to the rest of the brain. The biological equivalent
of our representation layer q, together with the working memory layer (in our model, h), might have
some properties of the brain’s global workspace.
Christof Koch and colleagues argue that the posterior hot zone (PHZ) is the minimal neural substrate
essential for conscious perception (Koch et al., 2016). The PHZ includes sensory cortical areas in the
parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes. The biological equivalent of our representation layer (in our
model, q) might have some properties of the PHZ.
Another interesting point is that both theories assume mental states, well delineated from all the
other states. Such a process is going on in our sampling approach if one interprets a sample as a decision
on an interpretation: “It’s a bird, or a plane, or it’s Superman, but not all of them at the same time”
(Dehaene, Lau, & Kouider, 2017). (Dehaene, 2014) talks about a similar process of “... collapsing
all unconscious probabilities into a single conscious sample ...”. His model assumes a “winning neural
coalition” whereas our sampling approach is much simpler, but maybe a reasonable approximation. The
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importance of sampling is also recognized in (Dehaene, 2014) in the context of conscious perception.
For example, the author states that “... consciousness is a slow sampler”.
In our model, working memory is part of a (non-standard) recurrent neural network. (Hassabis et al.,
2017) also discusses the connection between recurrent neural networks and working memory. Working
memory, of course, realizes many more functions and is not limited to storing intermediate processing
results in complex semantic decoding.
7.7 From Triple Statements to Language
Humans differ from other animals in their ability to express themselves in the form of natural languages.
Human language is the basis for communication but also a means to argue and reason. The language of
thought hypothesis is the hypothesis that mental representation has a linguistic structure: thoughts are
sentences in the mind. (Fodor, 1975) describes the nature of thought as possessing “language-like” or
compositional structure (sometimes referred to as mentalese). In this view, simple concepts combine
in systematic ways (akin to the rules of grammar in language) to build thoughts. From internal sen-
tences, generated by the semantic decoder, there is a direct path to external sentences, i.e., to human
communication by natural language.
Proposition 9 Both in our model and the human brain, the triple statements generated in perception
and memory recall are a basis for a language of thought and might be related to a form of an “inner
speech”.
Our work complements publications where the goal has been to automatically generate image anno-
tations (Cheng, Zhang, Fu, Tu, & Li, 2018). In our model, working memory is involved in semantic
decoding. Indeed, individuals with aphasia can demonstrate deficits in short-term memory, working
memory, attention, and executive function (Murray & Ramage, 2000). It is generally assumed that lan-
guage generation involves working memory but also several other areas, such as Broca’s area (Hickok &
Poeppel, 2007).
Consider a set of sentences, describing a complete scene. If Nscene is the number of bounding box
triples in a scene, then, in total, one can represent O((N2ENP)Nscene) different scene descriptions. We truly
achieve a form of a compositional benefit, compared to a one-hot encoding of image descriptions. True
perception only becomes possible by biasing this exponential space to the triple statements and sequences
of triple statements actually reflecting the statistics in the real world, as discussed next.
Triple statements can drive communication, argumentation and logical reasoning (Richardson &
Domingos, 2006; Hildebrandt et al., 2020). First, there is a clear advantage to communicate with other
agents about the part of the world, which is not perceived here and now. Thus an agent can tell another
agent not to leave the hide-out since there is a leopard waiting outside, which is hiding, and which
cannot directly be perceived. Second, scenes can be described with great accuracy, as just discussed.
Thus we can act better since we know more. Third, triple statements and language are prerequisites
for argumentation and logical reasoning and for studying advanced mathematics and the sciences. An
interesting question is: what came first? Did we develop semantic decoding to develop language and to
communicate —and improved perception and logical reasoning were by-products, which enabled us to
act better— or did we develop improved perception first, with language and reasoning as by-products?
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7.8 Consistency of a Set of Triple Statements
In this paper, we are focussing on dependencies between subject, predicate, and object in a triple state-
ment. Triple statements are not mutually independent, either, reducing the exponential space of possibil-
ities to combinations of triple statements, likely occurring in the actual world.
Probabilistic KG
A strength of our tensor models is that concept embeddings are mutually coupled in training, which leads
to nonlocal dependencies that implement an inductive form of reasoning (Nickel, Murphy, et al., 2015).
One might argue that this effect is only partially capturing patterns in the explicit triple statements that
are, for example, expressible in first-order logic (FOL). The work on Markov logic networks (MLNs)
(Richardson & Domingos, 2006) is among the most promising approaches, combining learning with
FOL expressibility. Unfortunately, in most technical applications, the success of logical inference is
quite limited: Typically, these models are brittle and difficult to handle and results are mixed.
Certainly, humans are able to reason on the conceptual level, master argumentation and potentially
even logical reasoning, and it remains a challenge to develop technical systems of similar power and
robustness. Checking for logical inconsistencies and doing human-level argumentation and logical rea-
soning probably needs a fully developed human intelligence including an advanced working memory.
There is also no ontological consistency check in most current large-scale KGs. For example, the
common RFD ontology standard does not contain a construct for negation and cannot produce onto-
logical contradictions. We would propose that the mind uses also a weak (shallow) ontology early in
processing and syntactic and semantic contradictions are resolved at a higher level of reasoning.6
Perception
Consider a variant, where, as an additional input, the model is obtaining input from the complete im-
age, not just from the currently selected bounding box triple. This introduces dependencies between
all extracted triples in an image and across all sets of bounding boxes and, thus, introduces dependen-
cies between extracted triple statements, as well. The chaining of triple decoding also introduces triple
dependencies (Figure 5).
On the other hand, a posteriori commitments are independent in our approach. For example, assume
that the triple (Sparky, looksAt, Jack) has a posterior probability of 80% and (Dog, looksAt, Jack) has
a posterior probability of 80%. If the agent commits to (Sparky, looksAt, Jack) being true, our model
would not change the probability for (Dog, looksAt, Jack), although logical reasoning on the declarative
triple-statement level should change the probability to 100%.
Scene interpretations with dependent triple statements can also be achieved by structured prediction.
Classical approaches are hidden Markov models or conditional random fields. Dependent commitments
are used in many scene graph models (Johnson et al., 2015; J. Yang et al., 2018). A very recent approach
is (Bengio, 2017). It attempts to capture dependencies by sparse factor graphs. Interestingly, leading
approaches to text modeling do not perform structured prediction, since output correlations are modeled
within the representation layers (Devlin, Chang, Lee, & Toutanova, 2018). Dependent commitments
6Google’s Jamie Taylor (http://videolectures.net/jamie taylor/) proclaimed that the Google KG is “RDF minus minus”,
where RDF is already a week ontology. Ontological reasoning simply introduces too many problems in large scale open KGs.
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can also be achieved by ontological/logic postprocessing, which belongs to the more recently acquired
faculties of the human brain.
In Section 5 we defined chatterbox decoding, which essentially means that a set of triples is generated
from an image, and there is no checking of semantic consistency after semantic decoding.
Proposition 10 In our model, and early on in brain evolution and development, semantic decoding of
sensory input behaves like a chatterbox.
Chatterbox decoding has many advantages. E.g., it is fast and it informs the agent about the uncertainty
in the decoding by providing several optional interpretations.
Proposition 11 An open question is what kind of reasoning is performed in the mind already at the
representation level (system-1) and how much is performed at the explicit sentence level (system-2)? The
latter might require executive functions, in particular in the case of ontological reasoning.
7.9 Semantic Memory
The probabilistic KG can be related to the brain’s semantic memory. In visual perception, semantic
memory defines the prior distribution for observing triples. A second function is that semantic memory
informs the agent about non-perceptual background.
A biological function is that semantic memory learns from the past to contribute to the present. It
fills in background knowledge about the non-perceived world by generating triples from the perceptual
semantic memory and from the non-perceptual background memory: Even if in the image the lion looks
sleepy and friendly, lions are often aggressive (perceptional semantic memory) and lions are dangerous
beasts (background semantic memory).
In literature, semantic memory is sometimes equated with concept engrams (Ralph et al., 2017).
From our viewpoint, there is a clear distinction. Concept engrams are the basis for semantic decoding,
employed in perception, episodic and semantic memory. What is special about the semantic memory in
our model is the semantic memory embedding vector which is the engram specific to semantic memory.
Proposition 12 Both in our model and the brain, perceptual semantic memory emerged out of percep-
tion’s semantic decoder. In addition to the concept engrams, our semantic memory model requires the
time-invariant semantic memory embedding a¯ (Equation 15), which could be related to the perceptual
semantic memory engram in the brain and which might be attached with the semantic index e¯. See
Figures 3 and 5.
In our model, both perception and semantic memory rely essentially only on the semantic decoder.
This might explain the robustness of semantic memory to brain damage and aging. Only in the case
that working memory deteriorates, both perceptual decoding and semantic memory should deteriorate,
as well.
Proposition 13 In both our model and the brain, semantic memory contributes to enrich perception by
generating triple statements, a process which might be triggered through perception.
If the agent sees a lion, it might want to recall that lions can be aggressive, without a recall of a specific
past experience.
Semantic memory shows the power of semantic decoding. In our model, semantic memory is realized
by a fixed vector a¯, so it appears to contain little information. In connection with the semantic decoder,
the vector recovers all of semantic memory.
25
7.10 Episodic Engrams and Memory
In contrast to semantic memory, episodic memory requires a recollection of a prior experience (Tulving,
1985). The realization of an episodic memory engram in our model is straightforward: for each memo-
rable event, e.g. attached with emotion or novelty, we introduce a time index, et . Then, its embedding is
the activation of the representation layer at time instance t, i.e., at , which becomes the connection weight
vector between the time index and the representation layer (Equation 8).
Proposition 14 In our model, a new episodic engram for time instance t consists of a novel time index
et and its embedding, i.e., its connection vector to the representation layer, which reflects at . This is a
greatly simplified mathematical model of the much more complex operations in the brain.
For memory recall, the time index is activated, resulting in the activation of the representation layer with
the stored embedding vector at .7
Proposition 15 An episodic memory recall consists of the reconstruction of the embedding of the episodic
engram by activating the index et for the past time instance t, which leads to an engram reconstruction in
the representation layer. A similar reconstruction might happen already in animals’ brains; subsequent
declarative decoding, requiring a complex semantic decoder, might only be realized in humans.
Thus the recall of a past episodic memory associated with et happens primarily by a reconstruction
of at . Due to connectional reciprocity, this might activate sensory memory layer g and maybe even
earlier processing layers restoring the sensory impression of the past episodic memory. Episodic memory
storage and recall are on the representation level, which might already be relevant for animals, in general.
Declarative decoding of a past episodic memory, in contrast, might be unique to humans: We can verbally
report about past episodic memories!
In the mind, episodic memory is the result of rapid associative learning in that a single episode
and its context become associated and bound together and can be retrieved from memory after a single
episode. Episodic memory stores information of general and personal events (Tulving, 1972, 1985,
2002; Gazzaniga et al., 2013) and concerns information we “remember” including the spatiotemporal
context of events (Gluck, Mercado, & Myers, 2013). In the mind, an episodic memory experience is an
active process that involves details of the event and its location (Moscovitch et al., 2016). Sometimes
the reconstruction is considered a Bayesian process of reconstructing the past as accurately as possible
based on available engram information.
The formation of indices for episodic memory in the hippocampus is a well-accepted theory (Tonegawa,
Morrissey, & Kitamura, 2018). It goes back to the hippocampal memory indexing theory (Teyler & DiS-
cenna, 1986; Teyler & Rudy, 2007), which was long controversial. The indices have a relational memory
function in the sense that they bind together different dimensions in the representation layer. Little is
known about how exactly new episodic indices are formed in the brain and how they quickly set up the
connection patterns to the representation layer. Evidence for time cells in the hippocampus (CA1) have
recently been found (Eichenbaum, Sauvage, Fortin, Komorowski, & Lipton, 2012; Eichenbaum, 2014;
Kitamura, Sun, et al., 2015; Kitamura, Macdonald, & Tonegawa, 2015). There is some evidence that
indices might be quickly formed in the hippocampus by a process termed neurogenesis. Neurogenesis
has been established in the dentate gyrus (part of the hippocampal formation) from stem cells throughout
7We ignore here that at contains information on the three bounding boxes which need to be presented sequentially.
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adult life; these new neurons may be preferentially recruited in the formation of memories. In fact, it
has been observed that the adult macaque monkey forms a few thousand new neurons daily (Gluck et al.,
2013; Gould, Reeves, Graziano, & Gross, 1999), possibly to encode new information (Becker, 2005).
Retrieval of past episodic memory engrams can serve many purposes, discussed now.
1: Short and Medium Term Memory for Context
Episodic memory can provide a short to medium term memory, providing information which is not
readily available by sensory input or other forms of short term memory: As an example, an agent should
be aware why it is in the hide-out and that there is still a leopard waiting outside the hide-out, even
when the vicious beast is not visible. This form of episodic memory is sometimes affected by aging,
with deteriorations in both MTL and working memory (Daselaar, Cabeza, Ochsne, & Kosslyn, 2013).
In general, the mechanisms for forming new episodic memories are complex and thus quite sensitive to
traumatic brain injury.
2: Replay for Training
Episodic memory can be used to train implicit memories and semantic memory embedding, as well as
decision modules during a consolidation step, possibly by replay during sleep. This is the basic idea
behind the complementary learning systems (CLS) theory (McClelland et al., 1995; Kumaran et al.,
2016).
A gradual transition from episodic to semantic memory can take place, in which episodic memory
reduces its sensitivity and association to particular events, so that the information can be generalized as
semantic memory. Without a doubt, semantic and episodic memories support one another (Greenberg &
Verfaellie, 2010). Thus some theories speculate that episodic memory may be the “gateway” to semantic
memory (A. D. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Squire, 1987; A. Baddeley, 1988; Steyvers, Shiffrin, & Nelson,
2004; Socher et al., 2009; McClelland et al., 1995; Yee, Chrysikou, & Thompson-Schill, 2014; Kumar
et al., 2015).
In our model, this form of gradual learning concerns different components, first, the deep neural net-
work which maps visual input to latent representation, second, concept engrams and, third, the semantic
memory engram. Concept representations and the deep learning module might require little, if any, fine
tuning. Concept representations might have attractor properties in high dimensions, such that concept
fine-tuning might be robust. Training the semantic memory engram a¯, in contrast, is important for modi-
fying and extending semantic memory. Challenging is the absorption of new information without losing
existing information (catastrophic forgetting). Semantic memory replay might be a solution, where triple
samples generated by semantic memory itself are used in self-supervised training, together with samples
generated in perception.
3: Imagination and Planning
Episodic memory permits future-oriented mental time travel to evaluate future consequences of actions
(Schacter et al., 2012). Humans are able to mentally place themselves in the past, in the future, or in
counterfactual situations, a process called autonoetic consciousness.
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4: Consolidation in Long Term Memory for Decision Support
Systems consolidation of memory (SCM) concerns the consolidation of memory into neocortex. The
standard theory assumes that, at some point, episodic memory becomes independent of hippocampus
and MTL over a period of weeks to years (Squire & Alvarez, 1995; Frankland & Bontempi, 2005).
In contrast, the multiple trace theory assumes that hippocampus and MTL remain involved (Nadel &
Moscovitch, 1997; Jonides et al., 2008; Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010). In general, it is assumed that
consolidation involves both MTL and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (Tonegawa et al., 2018).
During the course of consolidation, memories need to become interleaved into a network of existing
related memories in the neocortex (Edgell & Piaget, 1929; Bartlett, 1995). This interleaving process
incorporates new memories and typically requires modifications of the preexisting network structure to
add the new memories (Preston & Eichenbaum, 2013).
Proposition 16 Following our mathematical model, systems consolidation of memory in the brain would
involve a transfer of time indices from MTL to the neocortex, possibly by replay, where these index
duplicates would inherit the connection weights. For a while, both representations exist in parallel, but
gradually, the index representation in neocortex becomes dominant.
Episodic memory will mostly consolidate in long term memory those events that are memorable,
unexpected or attached with emotion. Associated with those memories might be past decisions and
actions, potentially with attached outcomes. An important capability for an agent is the comparison
of the current situation to previous experiences: If a current event is very similar to a past event, and
that past event triggered a certain action, it makes sense that the current event should trigger the same
action —if it led to a good outcome— including a prognosis of what to expect next. As an example: the
agent finds the current situation very similar to a previous one where the next thing was an attack by a
leopard, so better watch out! A recall can simply be triggered based on similarities in the representation
layer, potentially involving an attention mechanism. In general, much of the temporal resolution is lost
in consolidation, and episodic memories become more like snapshots rather than detailed sequences of
events. Memory consolation might be a process executed completely or partially during sleep (Stickgold,
2005).
7.11 The Relationship between Semantic Memory and Consolidated Episodic Memory
Some researchers consider semantic memory simply as being consolidated episodic memory. Our model
would support a very close relationship between both. After all, the only difference in our model is that
an episodic memory recall requires the activation of the consolidated time index et , whereas a semantic
memory requires the activation of the semantic memory index e¯. The semantic engram, consisting of
e¯ and a¯, might be established directly in neocortex, and not first in hippocampus. Mathematically, a
recall of a semantic memory becomes close to the activation of all time indices concurrently, since
a¯ ≈ 1/NT ∑NTt=1 at , and, in this sense, a semantic memory is an episodic memory, where the time index
is lost. Thus one thing that is going on in memory consolidation during sleep is that we adjust our prior
distribution to new experiences!
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8 Experiments
8.1 Dataset
We tested our model on the Visual Relation Detection (VRD) (Lu et al., 2016) dataset, which is the basis
for many research works on visual relationship detection. We used the more commonly used split of
this dataset which contains 100 object classes and 70 predicates with 4000 images used for training, and
1000 images for testing. These images contain an overall number of 37,993 triples from which 6,672 are
unique, and 1,877 of these unique triples are in the test set for zero-shot evaluations.
8.2 Metric
We report our results using Recall@K metric which is defined as the mean ratio of ground truth labels
in each image that appears in the model’s top K predictions. Recall@K is a popular choice in most of
the related visual relation detection studies. The main reason is the incompleteness of visual relation
detection datasets, i.e., some relations might not be annotated in the test set, while due to the model’s
generalization, they might get higher prediction values than the annotated ones.
8.3 Architectures
We use Faster R-CNN for the object detection backbone employed before the sensory memory layer. The
VGG-16 architecture within this framework (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) is pre-trained on ImageNet
(Russakovsky et al., 2015) and fine-tuned to our data for relation detection. The sensory memory g is a
fully connected layer with 4096 neurons. Representation layer q and working memory layer h are also
fully connected layers with 4096 and 500 neurons respectively.
8.4 Results
Table 1 shows the results of our ablation studies and also from (Baier et al., 2017). Unless specified
otherwise, we report Recall@100. Here, ph stands for phrase detection and pr stands for predicate
detection. In phrase detection setting we are concerned with the detection rate of both the bounding
boxes and the triples. In predicate detection, subject concept and object concept are both given and the
task is to predict the predicate. For z-s-ph/z-s-ph (zero-shot), we only evaluate the test set performance
on triples that did not occur in training. The first row (Model) shows results for our model. Our model
gives better results for the zero-shot experiments. The last two columns report recall results for only the
semantic memory (Recall@10, Recall@1). The first row shows results where the semantic memory was
extracted from our perceptual model. The results (82.46 and 53.53) are worse than the result for (Baier
et al., 2017), where the latter was trained directly on the triple data. S1 and S9 show results where we
added 1 and 9 epochs of pure semantic training to the perception model. We see that the semantic model
improves significantly with almost no degradation on perception. Dir are results where we removed the
working memory, i.e., we used the simple decoder.
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Table 1: Experimental results.
Method ph z-s-ph pr z-s-pr @10 @1
Model 23.45 10.95 93.32 78.79 82.46 53.53
S1 23.32 10.44 93.17 80.07 93.46 67.55
S9 22.61 9.24 92.77 79.47 94.77 68.68
Baier 25.11 7.96 93.81 76.05 95.86 70.50
Dir 11.13 7.87 77.19 65.61 - -
Rand 0.01 0.00 18.53 16.51 0.08 0.01
9 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a mathematical model for perception, episodic memory, and semantic memory, and
related it to cognitive models of the human brain. Our mathematical approach is based on tensors and
their embedding models. In particular, we suggested that indices and index embeddings, which are
central to tensor models, are equally important for an understanding of the functioning of the human
brain. We have shown how knowledge graphs can be queried by a stochastic triple sampling process,
which might be related to the way that the brain queries memories.
Our main hypothesis is that episodic memory, semantic memory, and to some degree also working
memory, are by-products of the need for humans to extract more meaningful and more complex informa-
tion from sensory inputs. For the generation of explicit triple statements, memory and perception share
a semantic decoder. We have discussed the close relationship between semantic memory and episodic
memory.
Attention is an important topic to explore in future work. Attention already plays a big role in our ap-
proach but its real role is much greater. First, the selection of the bounding boxes for subject, object, and
predicate contains an attention process. By focussing on selected bounding boxes, we greatly reduced
complexity and avoided the challenging task of finding a scene explanation by multiple causes, a diffi-
cult issue that needs to be addressed in the Harmonium (Smolensky, 1986) and the restricted Boltzmann
machine (Hinton, 2010). Second, an attention mechanism might guide the sampling into the s-o-p or-
der, i.e., in sampling an entity first (subject), then another entity (object), and finally a predicate. Third,
we can generate triples either from perception, or from episodic memory, or from semantic memory.
The decision, in which situation which one of these three sources should generate samples to excite the
representation layer, also requires an attention mechanism.
A second future project considers forecasting. Forecasting in temporal knowledge graphs is an active
area of research and certainly is relevant for understanding the mind’s operations, in particular in the
context of a Bayesian brain theory (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997).
It would also be interesting to explore links to decision making and action initiation. Improving both
is the ultimate goal and is essential for an agent’s survival (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Flanagan, 2001).
Decision making is associated with the executive functions of the working memory. In our model, inputs
for the decision modules would be provided by working memory and by the representation layer. In
principle, units in the index layer could also be relevant, but since an index activates many units in the
representation layer, the latter is likely to dominate the response. In our model, decisions can be made
very quickly as a direct reaction to visual input. On the other hand, a decision based on the semantic
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decoding of the complete scene would be quite involved and would take longer, but might be more
informed. Episodic information can recover past experiences and their emotional attachments and thus
influence decisions, as can input from semantic memory. Another interesting view is that decisions are
made without involving conscious decision making: (Gazzaniga et al., 2013) suggests that consciousness
is a tale that the brain tells itself to explain what it is doing, by using the so-called left-brain interpreter.
Finally, it would be interesting to explore the question of how the brain manages to quickly store a
new episode. As discusses, a technical implementation is quite simple: A new index is formed, together
with a connection vector copying the episodic memory trace. How this is done in brainware is still largely
unknown (Quiroga, Fried, & Koch, 2013).
Model performance can certainly be improved in many ways, but our aim was the simplest plausible
model obeying basic constraints imposed by brainware.
This paper was concerned with the question: Why did humans develop semantic decoding and ex-
plicit memory in the first place, and what are relationships to technical systems? The focus was not on
the study of the fully developed faculties of the human mind, with its amazing dimensions of intellectual
skills.
Note Added in Proof
The experimental results are preliminary and will be updated shortly. Code will be made available, as
well.
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10 Appendix: Semantic Decoding
We describe a concrete implementation of the triple generating process for perception described in Sec-
tion 4, under the architectural constraints discussed in Section 6.
The three bounding boxes are sequentially presented as visual inputs. A bounding box triple defines
a time instance t. Figure 5 (top) shows the processing steps. Figure 5 (bottom) shows the processing
steps as suggested in (Tresp et al., 2019).
10.1 Predicting the Subject Identity
Consider first BBsub,t . In the first step, the activation in the representation layer is
q := a(BBsub,t)
where a(BBsub,t) = D× g(BBsub,t). Here, g(BBsub,t) describes a deep neural network mapping from
BBsub,t to g, and D is a learned connection matrix. Then,
P(S = s|BBsub,t ,BBpred,t ,BBobj,t) = softmaxS(aTs q).
This represents the activation of the entity indices as a response to the visual input and corresponds to
Equation 9 in our tensor model.
In the next instance, we sample from this categorical distribution. The sampled s∗ then activates
the representation layer, as q := as∗ , and the whole mind is informed about the sampled subject entity.8
8Note that, for biological reasons (we cannot look into the future), we have made the simplification that
P(S = s|BBsub,t ,BBpred,t ,BBobj,t)≈ P(S = s|BBsub,t)
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Technically, the mapping from BBsub,t to the indices is a feedforward neural network classifier with NE
outputs.9
10.2 Predicting the Object Identity
Information about the subject sample s∗ and its visual grounding in the current bounding box, a(BBsub,t),
is stored in working memory layer h, as
hS = sig(V (as∗+a(BBsub,t))) .
Here, V is the connection matrix from the representation layer to the working memory layer. We set
q := a(BBobj,t)+W sig(BhS)
with a(BBobj,t) = D× g(BBobj,t); q now represents sensory information from the object bounding box
and input from the working memory. W is the connection matrix from the working memory to the
representation layer.
An object o∗ is then sampled from
P(O = o|S = s∗,BBsub,t ,BBpred,t ,BBobj,t) = softmaxO(aTo q).
This represents the activation of the entity indices as a response to the visual input and subject information
and corresponds to Equation 10 in our tensor model. The sampled o∗ then activates the representation
layer, as q := ao∗ , and the whole mind is informed about the sampled object entity.10
10.3 Predicting Predicates
In the third step, we predict the predicates. We aggregate all past information into the working memory
layer, as
hS,O = sig
V (ao∗+W sig(BhS)+a(BBobj,t))
optional︷ ︸︸ ︷
+BhS
 .
We set
q := a(BBpred,t)+W sig(BhS,O)
This can be justified by assuming that the subject is well defined by the subject bounding box.
9Written in the form of Equation 9, fsubw (as,at) = aTs a(BBsub,t).
10Here we approximate,
P(O = o|S = s∗,BBsub,t ,BBpred,t ,BBobj,t)≈ P(O = o|S = s∗,BBsub,t ,BBobj,t).
Written in the form of Equation 10,
fobjw (as,ao,at) = aTo
(
a(BBobj,t)+W sig(Bsig(V (as +a(BBsub,t))))
)
.
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with a(BBpred,t) = D× g(BBpred,t); q now represents sensory information from the predicate bounding
box and input from the working memory. We get
P(P = p|S = s∗,O = o∗,BBsub,t ,BBobj,t ,BBpred,t) = softmaxP(aTp q).
This represents the activation of the predicate indices as a response to the visual input and corresponds
to Equation 11 in our tensor model.
The sampled p∗ then activates the representation layer, as q := ap∗ , and the whole mind is informed
about the sampled predicate entity.11
10.4 Integrated Triple Representation
After decoding, we can calculate
hS,P,O = sig
V (ap∗+W sig(BhS,O)+a(BBpred,t))
optional︷ ︸︸ ︷
+BhS,O

and
q :=W sig(BhS,P,O)
which are triple statement embeddings. They integrate information about the triple and can also serve as
an initialization for follow-up triple decoding, providing context.
10.5 Interpreting Probabilities and Samples
We review the discussion presented in the main part of the paper.
Perception and Episodic Memory
Assuming a sufficiently well performing decoding system, any decoded triple sample (s∗, p∗,o∗) repre-
sents very likely a true triple statement, in the sense that ys,p,o,t = 1. Example: at time instance t, we
decode that (Jack, looksAt, Mary). Following the above formulas, we should get
P(S = s,P = p,O = o|BBsub,t ,BBpred,t ,BBobj,t)≈ 1∑s,p,o ys,p,o,t
which, even for true triples, can be much smaller than 1. Thus the samples are easier to interpret than the
conditional probabilities.
11It is important that subject and object embeddings enter asymmetrically in the equation, so the agent can distinguish
between “dog bites person” and “person bites dog”. Written in the form of Equation 11,
f predw (as,ap,ao,at)= aTp
a(BBpred,t)+W sig(Bsig[V (ao +W sig(Bsig(V (as +a(BBsub,t))))+a(BBobj,t))
optional︷ ︸︸ ︷
+Bsig(V (as +a(BBsub,t)))])
 .
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In sampling, we can fix a particular s˜ as being the subject, instead of using a sampled s∗. Then
the sampling would produce a decoded triple sample (s˜, p∗,o∗); i.e., conditioning results in a selection
process concerning the true triple statements. As an example, we might have selected s˜ = Mary and we
decoded that (Mary, looksAt, David).
Semantic Memory
Any decoded triple sample (s∗, p∗,o∗) represents a sample from the prior distribution for the perception
process. Thus it should be interpreted as the prior probability that a triple is generated in the perceptual
sampling process. The semantic sampling might have produced that (Jack, looksAt, Mary), which is a
probable triple in the prior distribution. As before, we might have selected s˜ = Mary and we decoded
that often (Mary, looksAt, David).
As discussed in Section 5.6, we assume that the background probabilistic KG is a static KG. With a
perfect model, sampling from this static KG produces with high likelihood only true triples. As example:
a triple produced by the background semantic memory might be that (Jack, sibling, Mary). As before,
we might have selected s˜ = Mary and we decoded that (Mary, sibling, Jack). With incomplete data and
an approximating model, of course, true triples might be missed in sampling.
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Figure 5: Perceptual decoding. Each node represents a complete layer. The q-layer units (green) have a
linear response, the h-layer units (blue) have a sigmoidal response, and the e layer (red) has a joint soft-
max response, from which an index is sampled. Top: Operations as described here. The architectures
implement several constraints: First, all communication between layers passes through the representa-
tion layer q. Second, there is a direct path BB→ g→ q→ e for fast perception. Third, the working
memory layer h layer integrates all previous information (information on present and past visual in-
puts and on past sampling decisions). Fourth, via q, the index layer e receives information from the
bounding box BB and the working memory layer h. The three boxes on the right side indicate the
replacement of the sensory module by episodic memory, resp., semantic memory; shown here for the
subject, but similar for object and predicate. Note, that for episodic memory we have the decomposition
at = [a(BBsub,t);a(BBpred,t);a(BBobj,t)] and for semantic memory a¯ = [a¯sub; a¯pred; a¯obj]. The dots to the
left and right side indicate that complex decoding can be chained and information can be propagated
forward to the next triple decoding. Bottom: Alternative implementation.
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